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Rethinking Bystander Non-lntervention: social categorisation and the evidence of 
witnesses at the James Bulger murder trial.
Abstract
Bystander apathy is a long established phenomenon in social psychology which has 
yet to be translated into practical strategies for increasing bystander intervention. 
This paper argues that the traditional paradigm is hampered by a focus on the 
physical co-presence of others rather than an analysis of the social meanings 
inherent in (non) intervention. The testimony provided by 38 bystanders at the trial 
of two ten year old boys for the murder of two and a half year old James Bulger is 
analysed. It is argued that their failure to intervene can be attributed to the fact that 
they assumed - or were told - that the three boys were brothers. The way in which 
this category of ‘ the family’ served to prohibit or deflect intervention is analysed.  
This approach is contrasted with a traditional bystander apathy account of the 
bystanders actions in the Bulger case.  It is argued that bystander (non) intervention 
phenomenon should be analysed in terms of the construction of social categories in 
local contexts.
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Introduction
On Friday 12th February 1993, James Bulger, a two and a half year old boy, was 
abducted from his mother by two ten year old boys. The three boys then walked 
around the city of Liverpool, England, for more than two hours before James was 
murdered beside a railway line. It was a crime that seized the public imagination, 
attracting saturation newspaper and television coverage in Britain (Franklin and 
Petley 1996) as well as the attention of the international media (see Christy and 
Voigt 1994, Bourquin 1994, Gripsrud 1995). The case was also the focus of a number 
of books and articles (Thomas, 1993, Smith 1994, Sereny 1994a, 1994b, 1995, Jackson 
1994, Morrison 1997). Much of this work centres on the question of what, if 
anything, this brutal murder tells us about the state of society. Attempts to answer 
this question are broken down into two parts: the first part is the question of why 
the two boys committed the murder. The second part is the question of why 
nobody intervened to stop them. It is the second of these questions that will be the 
concern of this paper. What lessons can we learn about bystander non-intervention 
from this case?
There is a curious and rather uncomfortable parallel between the James Bulger 
murder and the case that was the progenitor of the bystander intervention 
paradigm: the murder of Kitty Genovese in New York in 1964.  There were 38 
witnesses to the rape and murder of Kitty Genovese outside her apartment building 
in New York in an attack which lasted for more than half an hour (Rosenthal 1964). 
It was the failure  of the witnesses to intervene that was the starting point for a 
series of investigations by Latane and Darley (1968, 1970, Darley and Latane 1968). 
This work culminated in what became known as the 'bystander effect' - the finding 
that people are more likely to receive help when a single bystander is present, than 
when a group of bystanders are present. In their review of the first ten years of 
work on bystander non-intervention, Latane and Nida (1981) argue that this 
phenomenon is one of the most replicated and well founded in social psychology. 
However, in spite of this strong claim they go on to say that “the research has not 
contributed to the development of practical strategies for increasing bystander 
intervention. .[..].. not one of us has been able to mobilise the increasing store of 
social psychological understanding accumulated over the last decade to devise 
suggestions for ensuring that future Kitty Genoveses will receive help” (Latane and 
Nida 1981: 322). This is amply demonstrated by the fate of James Bulger. In an echo 
of the Genovese case, 38 witnesses were called at the trial of Jon Thompson and 
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Robert Venables for the murder of James Bulger. These 38 witnesses had all seen or 
had contact with the three boys on their walk across Liverpool to the place where 
James was killed. None had  intervened successfully to save his life.
In this paper I will argue that this failure to translate research on the bystander effect 
into practical strategies for increasing intervention may be a function of how the 
research question itself has been conceptualised.  Whilst there has been some work 
on the importance of the characteristics of individual bystanders  (Bickman 1971, 
Clark 1974, Cramer, McMaster, Bartel and Dragna 1988; see also Eagly and Crowly 
(1986) for a review of the work on gender and helping), most researchers have 
focussed on the question of  ‘number of people present' in helping situations. This 
emphasis can clearly be seen in Latane and Nida's (1981) review of the literature in 
which more than fifty studies were included in a meta-analysis which used 'number 
of bystanders present' as the key analytic variable. This paper will begin by 
considering why 'number of people present' became the key question in bystander 
intervention research and then look at some of the issues which are obscured or 
omitted by the focus on this particular question. I will then go on to argue, based on 
the evidence given by the witnesses to the James Bulger murder trial, that it may be 
more useful to think about the question of intervention in terms of the way social 
categories are deployed to make sense of (and account for) the event, rather than 
the question of how many people are physically co-present at the scene.
Decontextualising bystander (non) intervention - Kitty Genovese revisited
In order to ground this critique of the traditional bystander paradigm it is necessary 
to go back to the Kitty Genovese case and explore how the murder was originally 
translated into a series of psychological questions. Darley, in an interview with 
Evans (Evans 1980: 216) describes how he and Latane sat around a dinner table and 
began to analyse the incident in social psychological terms. They eschewed 
'personality' accounts of the bystanders behaviour in favour of immediate 
situational factors that might have inhibited helping. They picked up on current 
social psychological work in 'group-inhibition' and 'diffusion of responsibility', and 
used such concepts as the fulcrum of their work. They then went into the laboratory 
and produced a number of inventive, detailed and highly choreographed 
experiments in which the number of people present (or believed to be present) was 
the key variable. The experiments explored helping in situations like an epileptic 
seizure (Darley and Latane 1968), a potential fire  (Latane and Darley 1970) and an 
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accident at work (Latane’ and Darley 1975). Based on this work, a five stage model 
of bystander intervention was proposed. For intervention to occur a bystander 
would need to notice the event; interpret it as a emergency; assume personal 
responsibility; feel competent to help; and then help. It was argued that a break in 
any one of the steps in the model would lead to a failure to intervene. It was at the 
third stage of the model that group inhibition or diffusion of responsibility was seen 
to have most influence. The presence of other people seemed to inhibit feelings of 
personal responsibility. Very quickly evidence began to mount for the 'bystander 
effect' - the general principle that numbers of people present and likelihood of help 
were inversely related. This then became the predominant strand of bystander 
research - the legacy of the experimental work which had begun with Kitty 
Genovese.
Cherry (1995) argues that this translation from event to research topic is an example 
of what she calls 'culturally embedded theorising'. A number of important features 
of the original event were not translated into the research paradigm because they 
were not yet recognised as 'problems'. For example, Cherry points out that the 
Genovese murder was a violent attack by a man on a woman. It could have been 
seen as a prototypical example of male violence towards women (as Brownmiller 
(1975) was later to do). However, in the early 1960's  the feminist critique of male 
violence had yet to become established. The public at large, and academic 
psychologists in particular, were not yet sensitised to male violence as a social and 
psychological problematic. As a consequence, neither gender nor physical violence 
were factored into the original laboratory studies that attempted an experimental 
analogue of the Kitty Genovese murder. In almost all of these studies the focus is on 
generalised helping behaviour and diffusion of responsibility rather than male-
female relatedness.  While it may be that the bystander effect holds for these 
decontextualised and mainly laboratory based studies, Cherry goes on to show that, 
in the few studies which did retain an interest in both gender and violence, a 
different story emerges. For example, Borofsky et al (1971) conducted a role playing 
experiment with male and female dyads in which an 'attack' was simulated. The 
'attacks' (male on female; male on male; female on male; female on female) were 
conducted in the presence of both male and female bystanders. In this experiment, 
intervention was at its lowest when a man was seen to injure a woman. None of the 
men intervened, and a lone women tried to stop an attack on another woman. 
Intervention was significantly higher for the men in all other conditions. The authors 
explained the male bystanders’ failure to intervene to help a female victim by the 
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possible 'vicarious sexual or hostile gratification from seeing a man injure a woman' 
(Borofsky et al 1971: 317). In another, similar study Shotland and Straw (1976) 
conducted an elaborate set of experiments in which a man attacked a women in the 
presence of a bystander. In these studies intervention occurred much more 
frequently when subjects were led to believe that the couple were strangers (65%) 
than when they were married (19%). In addition, when subjects were unsure about 
the nature of the relationship they were likely to infer an intimate connection 
between the man and the women and thus be less likely to intervene to stop the 
attack. Shotland and Straw (1976) concluded that intervention on the part of a 
bystander was dependent on whether the violence was seen as being part of a 
‘domestic’ dispute or not.  Subjects in the ‘married’ condition claimed that the 
violence they had witnesses was ‘a private matter’; ‘none of my business’ or not 
particularly serious. This suggests that the perceived relationship between those 
involved in the violence had served to ‘legitimate’ the violence more than would 
have been the case had the violence occurred between strangers. It also served to 
interfere with the bystanders’ beliefs about the necessity or legitimacy of 
intervention to help the women.
It is clear that from these studies that, by recontextualising the event, an alternative 
approach to the question of bystander intervention becomes possible. This is an 
approach which focusses on the meanings inherent in relationships between men 
and women; the assumptions other people make about the legitimacy of acts of 
violence between them; and the perceived legitimacy of outside intervention in 
violent disputes between couples in an intimate relationship. Moreover it is an 
approach which, as will be argued below, can be generalised to include consideration 
of bystander (non) intervention in contexts other than that of a violent attack by a 
man on a women.
Analysing non-intervention in the James Bulger murder
As has already been outlined above, the murder of James Bulger was preceded by 
his abduction by two ten year old boys who then walked James across Liverpool for 
two and a half hours. During this time they came into contact with (at least) 38 
people who were later to give evidence at the trial. None of these bystanders  
intervened successfully to save James from his fate.  Given Cherry's injunction 
against the abstraction of social meaning in explaining intervention, in beginning to 
theorise about the behaviour of bystanders in the James Bulger murder, three key 
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questions need to be answered. The first of these relates to the perceived 
relationship between James Bulger and his two ten year old abductors. How did the 
bystanders conceive of the relationship between the three boys? The second 
question relates to the way the bystanders viewed their own relationship with the 
boys as they encountered them in different parts of the city. Finally, and given the 
relationships that the bystanders believed to exist, the third question concerns the 
extent to which intervention was seen as something that was socially appropriate. In 
the analysis which follows,  the issues which might have been addressed by a more 
traditional approach to bystander non intervention will also be considered.  This will 
include the question of whether the bystanders noticed and interpreted the situation 
unfolding before them as a potential emergency.  The question of whether the 
presence of others was an inhibiting factor on intervention will also briefly be 
addressed. Before beginning the analysis however, it is important to provide more 
detailed background information not only about about the events surrounding the 
murder but also about the Court case itself, in order to set the analysis of the 38 
bystanders evidence in appropriate context.
Background to the analysis
James Patrick Bulger, aged two years and six months, was abducted from the Strand 
Shopping Centre in Bootle, Liverpool on Friday 12 February 1993 at 3:41 in the 
afternoon by two ten year old boys, Jon Thompson and Robert Venables. The 
abduction was captured on close circuit video cameras in the shopping centre. 
Thompson and Venables then walked James out of the shopping centre and around 
Liverpool for approximately two and a half hours before murdering him alongside a 
railway line several miles away from the site of the original abduction. After some 
initial speculation that the abduction was the work of an adult - or that the two older 
boys had procured James for an adult, Thompson and Venables were identified and 
arrested 6 days later and charged with the murder. The trial was heard at Preston 
Crown Court in Lancashire, between Monday 1st November and Friday 26th 
November 1993 before Mr Justice Michael Moreland. Under English law the age of 
criminal responsibility is 10 and the law insists that, where children are accused of 
homicide, they should be tried before a jury in an adult court. However, at that time, 
as part of a provision known as doli capax, children between the ages of 10 and 14 
could only be be convicted of a crime if it could be proved that they knew what they 
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were doing was 'seriously wrong - and not just 'naughty’1. Thus, a major part of the 
trial was concerned with demonstrating that the two ten year olds knew that their 
action was 'seriously wrong' and that they were both mutually responsible. In fact it 
was a central theme in the prosecution case that both boys had deliberately and with 
premeditation set out to abduct a young child with the aim of murdering him. The 
defence was one based on mutual antagonism. Each defendant accused the other of 
being both the instigator of the abduction and the murderer. In addition, the defence 
set out to show that the abduction was not premeditated, but rather a prank that 
went disastrously wrong. It was in this context that the 38 witnesses were called to 
give evidence. The prosecution used the witnesses to show that both boys were 
equally implicated and that their actions revealed them to have premeditated 
murder in mind. In practice this meant that the prosecution asked the witnesses to 
confirm that they had seen the boys together; to provide accounts of the two older 
boys’ behaviour which might indicate premeditation and mutual responsibility; and 
finally to provide identification evidence which would link the two accused to the 
crime. The defence used the witnesses to attempt to show either that one boy was 
more responsible than the other, or that the boys’ actions demonstrated that they 
had no clear plan in mind and were anxious to get themselves out of trouble. It was 
under this cross examination that the actions of the bystanders themselves 
occasionally became a topic of debate and, as a consequence, where bystanders were 
asked to justify or account for their failure to intervene.
Materials and Analytic Background
The analysis was carried out on the relevant sections of the transcript of the trial of 
Robert Thompson and Jon Venables for the murder of James Bulger at Preston 
Crown Court, Lancashire, England. The thirty eight witnesses were examined and 
cross examined over a period of four working days from Thursday 4th November 
1993 to Tuesday 9th November 1993. The transcript was provided by the Crown 
Court Stenographers (Cater Walsh and Co. of Kidderminster, England) and was a 
verbatim account of the proceedings on every day of the trail. As in the case of other 
official records of debates and exchanges (eg the Hansard reports of proceedings in 
the British House of Commons) the transcripts had been tidied up somewhat. There 
is no record of pauses, overlaps or other linguistic infelicities. However, for the 
purposes of this analysis, a verbatim and sequential account is sufficient. The level of 
1 In March 1994 this long standing rule was abolished in the High Court by Lord Justice Mann 
(Young 1996)
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analysis to which the transcripts were subjected was not at the level of the structure 
of conversation, but rather at the level of the content and deployment of social 
categories.
The preparation of transcripts for analysis follows some of the conventions outlined 
by Potter and Wetherell (1987) for an analysis of discourse. The transcripts relating 
to each of the 38 witnesses were first examined carefully and any extract (including 
the question which preceded it) that referred to the witnesses observation of, or 
interaction with the three boys was recorded on a separate card. A distinction was 
also made between accounts that were given in response to questions from the 
prosecution, and accounts which were given in response to questions from the 
defence. In the analysis presented below, questions which were asked by Council for 
the Prosecution will be prefaced by the letters CP. Questions which were asked by 
Council for the defendant Thompson will be preceded by the letters CT and 
questions from Council for Venables by CV. Each witness will be identified by the 
order in which they were called to give evidence (which is also the chronological 
order in which they encountered the three boys) and will also be referred to by their 
initials to preserve anonymity (eg  B13 (Mrs SD)). 
The method of data analysis has  much in common with discourse analysis as 
proposed by Potter and Wetherell (Potter and Wetherell, 1987; Wetherell and Potter 
1988, 1992). However, the analysis differs from the procedures they suggest in one 
important respect. Their principle concern has been to analyse the usage of various 
‘interpretive repertoires’ in “constructing versions of actions, cognitive processes 
and other phenomena” (Wetherell and Potter 1988, p172). While they do not give 
precise criteria for distinguishing one repertoire from another, they note that each 
repertoire tends to derive from one or more key metaphors and can be identified by 
certain tropes or figures of speech. However, given the aims of this paper, the focus 
of analysis is concerned less with the use of interpretative repertoires and more with 
the ways in which bystanders invoke particular social categories. In drawing this 
distinction the analysis follows the argument advanced by  Macnaughten, 
(Macnaughten 1992, Macnaughten et al 1992) that repertoires should be defined in 
terms of the way they define social relations. (For previous examples of such an 
approach in different contexts  see Reicher and Hopkins 1996a, 1996b). This 
approach can also be distinguished from work which is concerned with a more fine 
grained analysis of the structure and function of language in Court settings 
(Atkinson and Drew 1979). That is not to say that such issues could not fruitfully be 
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explored, but that the concern in this paper is with broader questions of social 
relations and normative values and the role they play in (non) intervention.  In 
short, the analysis in this paper will concentrate on three key issues.   The first 
concerns the way bystanders construct the relationships between the three boys in 
the evidence they gave to the Court. The second concerns the way  bystanders 
construct the relationships between themselves and the three boys in their evidence. 
Finally, there is the question of the  consequences for intervention of the 
construction of such social category relationships.
Analysis
Before we can explore the question of whether  social category relationships played 
an important role in the failure of the bystanders to intervene, it is necessary to 
consider whether the bystanders had any reason to think intervention might be 
warranted in the first place. This is also a key question for traditional approaches to 
bystander non intervention. The traditional model suggests that, before a bystander 
will consider intervention, they must first notice an event and then interpret it as 
something which is potentially serious (Latane and Darley 1970). The first issue to be 
addressed in the Bulger case therefore is the question of whether the bystanders 
noticed that anything was amiss and also interpreted what they saw as something 
that might require action on their part.
One factor which had the potential to be something which bystanders might have 
noticed and seen as significant was the youthfulness of the three boys and the fact 
that they seemed to be wondering around the city of Liverpool without adult 
supervision.  James Bulger was only two and a half years old and the two older boys 
were only ten years old - and a very young looking ten according to observers at 
the Crown Court Trial (Smith 1994, Sereny 1996a, Morrison 1997).  The youthfulness 
of the three boys was commented on by some of the witnesses:
CT: Well, what you saw, you didn't feel that what was happening looked odd or 
unusual [..]
B7(Mrs PM): I just thought it seemed a bit odd because they seemed too young to be looking 
after a young boy.
CT: That was why it was called to your mind?
B7: Yes
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However, this on its own did not seem to be sufficient grounds for intervention. 
What seemed to have concerned the witnesses more was a highly visible injury 
which James Bulger  sustained during the first thirty minutes of his abduction. The 
cause of the injury was the subject of dispute between the prosecution and the 
defence, with the prosecution intimating that it was deliberately inflicted whilst the 
defence maintaining that it might have been accidental.  Whatever the cause, it was 
clear that the injury was clearly apparent to any of the witnesses who were in close 
proximity to the three boys. The injury was first described by the ninth bystander to 
be called, who came across the boys outside the Strand Shopping Centre about half 
an hour after the abduction. 
CP: And how close, Mrs B, were you to the boys at any time? How close did you get?
B9(Mrs B): About a couple of yards
[..]
CP: Why did the little boy draw attention to the the boys?
B9: Because he appeared to have a fresh bump on his forehead.
CP: What sort of bump was it Mrs B?
B9: It was, it looked as if it had been hurt on the road or something like that.
CP: Now Mrs B, I’m sorry, it is very difficult to hear what you are saying. Could you 
start again? I asked you what sort of bump it was.
B9: It was like a sort of mark that was noticeable, as if it was just done, like little 
speckly marks but it wasn't bleeding.
The testimony of subsequent  bystanders who came close enough to see James’s 
face also made reference to the injury:
CP: And from where you were, could you see the baby’s face?
B22 (Mrs IH): Yes
CP: And what could you see on the baby’s face?
B22: He was frightened
CP: Yes, what could you see physically?
B22: Well, a lump, here, on his forehead
CP: What about the little boy, did you get a good look at him?
B27 (Mr FW): Yes
CP: What did you notice about him?
B27: I first noticed the grazing on his forehead, the right side of his forehead, a fresh 
graze.
CP: Now, did you notice something about James?
B32(Child E): He had a bump on his left eye
CP: Bump on his left/
B32: Eye, right there.
CP: Was it above it or below it?
B32 Above it
CP: And did you look at the bump that he had, E?
B32: Yeah
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CP: What did the bump look like?
B32: It had like blue and red dots in and lines
In addition to the people who described the signs of a fresh injury on the two and a 
half year old boy, a number of other witnesses spoke of James Bulger’s evident 
distress:
CP: And can you tell us how how he was behaving at this stage?
B6(Mr MW): He was stood still. He was clearly very upset. He was crying his eyes out.
CP: Now  was he on his own or was he accompanied?
B6: He was stood on his own but there were two other boys in close proximity to him 
and I believed they were with him.
CP: Did you notice anything about any one of them?
B16 (Mr LJ): The small boy was crying
CP: Can you tell us anything about how the little child looked to you?
B17 (Mr RJ): He looked upset
CP:  And what gave you that impression?
B17: Well he was crying
From this evidence it seems as if the bystanders were aware of the distress and 
injury to James and also the youthfulness of the three boys.  It seems likely 
therefore that failure to intervene cannot simply be ascribed to a failure to notice 
that intervention might be warranted. This then raises the question of what other 
factors might have played a role in the way bystanders made sense of the situation 
unfolding before them, and how such factors played a part in their failure to 
intervene.
It has been argued above that, as in the case of violence between a man and a 
woman, beliefs about the nature of the category relationship between protagonists 
is crucial to whether bystanders will intervene or not.  Thus, in this analysis, one of 
the first questions that needs to be asked concerns the beliefs amongst bystanders 
about the relationship that existed between James Bulger and his abductors. The 
testimony of 33 of the 38 witnesses dealt at some stage with accounts of interactions 
between the three boys. Almost all the the witnesses were asked by the prosecution 
to confirm that they had seen the three boys together. Most of this evidence was in 
the form of confirmation that they had seen one or both of the older boys holding 
James’ hand, carrying him or making other physical or verbal contact with him. This 
evidence, in combination with identification evidence, was used by the prosecution 
to link both of the defendants jointly and equally to the abduction and murder. 
However, even in the absence of any form of physical or verbal contact between the 
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boys it was clear that those bystanders who crossed their path assumed that the 
three boys were together.
CP: Did it look as though he was separate to the others?
B5 (Mr DK): They looked like they  were together just walking up
CP: Together, but you would say it didn't look as if he was talking to the others?
B5: No.
If the bystanders assumed that the three boys were together, this then raises the 
question of what they considered the nature of this relationship to be. In this 
instance it is clear that the bystanders, when confronted with the three boys,  
considered them to share a category relationship. More specifically, they assumed 
that the three boys were from the same family -   they assumed they were brothers:
CP: First of all I am going to ask you what it was that you saw, and then where you 
 saw it. Can you tell us please, first of all, what you saw?
B1(Mrs MK): I saw a little boy apparently two and a half to three years of age ..[..]. He was 
holding, it looked to be a teenager’s hand which I presumed was his older 
brother. 
CP: What was the next thing you saw Mrs K?
B3(Mrs K): I thought, I noticed he was on his own and I thought, he is going to look round and 
say, “where’s me mum, I’ve lost me mum?” And I was going to get up out of the 
shop to go to him but then a boy waved him over towards him so I just thought, 
“Oh, it must be his brother.”
CP: And what did you see happen after the little boy had been taken back to the one 
who had the beige coat?
B7 (Miss PM): There was talking going on between them but I couldn't hear what they  were 
talking about, and the little boy didn't appear to be bothered then once he was 
back with his friend, so I just thought it was relatives or brothers or 
something.
CP: And could you see the little lad’s face?
B14 (Mr MP): Yeah
CP: Tell us what you saw please.
B14 It was all bright red and he was crying
CP: Now, bright red and crying. Now at that stage, what did this group appear to you 
to be?
B14: Older brothers taking him home.
In addition to assuming that the three boys were brothers, bystanders also assumed 
that the two older boys had been left in loco parentis.  That is, they assumed that the 
parents of the three brothers had left the younger boy in the care of the two older 
boys.  For some bystanders, the encounter with the three boys seemed nothing 
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more than a moment in the return of a distressed younger child to his mother by 
two older brothers.
CP: And where did they seem to be going?
B13 (Mrs MD): Well, I thought they were going to the Post Office, because the baby was crying. 
I thought they were taking the baby to his mum at the Post office, but they didn’t.
I overtook them and they turned left at the railings.
For other bystanders however, this perceived domestic arrangement was  a source 
of disquiet. One woman, who saw the younger boy being swung vigorously by the 
arms between the two older boys, reported to the court that she had shouted out in 
alarm to travelling companions on a bus:
B11 (Mrs KR): I shouted on the bus sir, I shouted and all the people looked at me and looked to 
the window as I shouted, and I shouted, ‘ what kinds of friggin parents have they 
got, to let them out with a child like that?’ to the man behind me. That's how 
disgusted I was with them swinging him.
For this witness, the behaviour of the older boys called into question the judgment 
of what (she believed to be) the three boys’ parents in giving the older boys such a 
supervisory role.  The older boys’ behaviour demonstrated their unsuitability to be 
given such a role, as they were, in her opinion, behaving in an irresponsible manner.  
There is clearly (as the defendants lawyers pointed out in cross examination) a 
question of interpretation here. This kind of swinging  by the arms can often be 
done by parents for for the entertainment of a small child. There is a complex set of 
interrelationships at work here between the account the witness offers of what she 
saw; the kinds of category information she uses to make sense of what she saw; and 
the observed behaviour itself. However, what is clear is that the witness assumes the 
boys are brothers and that the older boys had been given parental responsibility, 
even if they were violating appropriate parental standards.
For other witnesses however, assumptions about the parental role of the older boys 
over the younger boy was a function of their apparently responsible behaviour 
towards the toddler.
CP: When you saw the three people inside the shop, what did you see about them?
B29 (Ms MC): The taller of the two boys had hold of the toddler in a way that a parent may 
keep hold of a child.
For this witness, the interaction between older and younger boy reflected both a 
supervisory relationship and an intimacy which is normally associated with an adult-
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child relationship. This was the kind of relationship you might expect to find 
between an older sibling and a younger sibling who had been left in his charge. The 
assumption about a sibling relationship turns the actions of the older boy into an act 
of ‘care’  rather than the actions of an abductor who was anxious to monitor the 
behaviour of his young abductee.  Moreover, it also turns on the idea of control. If 
the two older boys had been entrusted with a younger charge, and had been given 
parental responsibilities over him, then they hold the right to restrain and discipline 
the younger child in the same way that any parent would.  Any interactions 
between the two older boys and the younger boy  which bystander might witness 
would therefore be subject to the conventions that usually apply to parent-child 
interactions. The fact that (even when they involve an adult) these might include 
public acts of violence including smacking, shouting or pulling, might make such 
actions difficult to challenge when occurring between the three boys.
Thus far it has been argued that the bystanders believed there to be a category 
relationship between the boys; that the category relationship was one based around 
the family (the boys were brothers); and that it was assumed that the older boys had 
been left in charge of the younger boy.  Further analysis of the transcript material 
seems to suggest that this category relationship may have played an important role 
in the bystanders’ failure to intervene. At the very least, the category of the family 
played a central role in the accounts bystanders offered for their failure to intervene. 
For example, a number of witnesses who acknowledged seeing both the injury and 
the distress in the face of the younger boy, ascribed their failure to intervene to the 
fact that they assumed the boys were brothers:
CT: Can I ask you about the little boy? You noticed the graze? You didn't ask the little 
boy how he was and you didn't ask either of the boys how he had come by the 
graze?
B28 (Ms FS): No
CT: It wasn't sufficiently bad, nor was there anything in the boys’ demeanour to cause 
you to intervene?
B28: Yes, well I, when the three boys came in I automatically thought they were 
brothers
CT: Did you? Why would you automatically think that? I’m sorry I don't want to be 
accused of interrupting you.
B28: It was just the way they were holding him, maybe he might have run out into the 
road or run off. I thought that the way they were holding him, they mightn't have 
wanted him to run around the shop
In this exchange the witness seems to acknowledge that there might have been 
grounds for intervention, but explains her failure to act by reference  to the assumed 
category relationship between the three boys. It seems from this that, whilst 
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recognising the injury to the younger  child, she considers that the sibling 
relationship imbues the older boys with both the ability and the responsibility for 
dealing with the problem. Similar assumptions were made by other bystanders who 
actually engaged the three boys in conversation. In the following extract, a women 
who encountered the three boys while walking her dog, describes a conversation 
she had with the boys when she was alerted by James’s crying.
CP: Now, how close did you get to the three of them?
B22(Mrs IH): I got close to them because, as I am walking my dog around I heard crying and 
[...] I looked over to where the crying was coming from and the two little boys 
were pulling, as I call, the baby up the slope and as they came a bit further I said 
to them, ‘What’s the matter’ and one of the other of them said, ‘Oh he fell down 
there’, so I said - they are now at the top of the reservoir - so I walked to them 
and said, ‘ Now look, where are you going now?’  “ We are going home”. So at 
that stage I noticed a huge, big lump on top of the baby’s head, so I said, “You 
are going home? Well now, look, hurry up and get home and show his mum his 
head because it’s sore’.
This witness seems to begin from the assumption that the three boys are brothers. 
Her response to the account of how James sustained his injuries is not to offer help 
but rather to enquire what action the two older boys will take next. When she is told 
that they will be going home, she makes the logical assumption that they will be 
going to the same ‘home’ and that the mother of the three boys will then be able to 
deal with the injury.
In both of the extracts presented immediately above it is possible to imagine that 
intervention might be warranted even though the assumption that the three boys 
were brothers had been made. After all, there is nothing intrinsic in the assertion of 
a sibling relationship which would prevent a competent adult caregiver from taking 
control of all three boys. However, there seems to be something about the quality 
of this particular version of the category of ‘the family’ that appears to rule out 
intervention on the part of non family members. The fact that this category 
membership seems to inhibit helping is something that was clearly recognised by 
the two older boys themselves. On a number of occasions Thompson and Venables 
were able to deflect bystanders who were on the point of intervention by invoking a 
sibling relationship between themselves and James. The first example comes from 
an exchange described by a witness known as Child E, a boy who knew the 
defendant Thompson from school but who had not met Venables before. Child E 
was slightly older than both Thompson and Venables. He begins by saying that he 
was playing with a friend when the three boys came along.  Child E explains that he 
engaged the boys in conversation, asking who James was and how he sustained his 
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injuries (see previous extract from testimony of Child E (B32) above). Child E was 
clearly aware of the distress and injury to the toddler. In fact he reported trying to 
engage James in conversation but all James could do was cry. This then provoked 
the exchange described to the Court below:
CP: Right, now did you know who the little boy was then, on that day when you saw 
him? Had you ever seen him before?
B32 (Child E): No
CP: Did you want to know who he was?
B32: Yeah
CP : Did you ask a question about him?
B32: Yeah
CP: What did you ask?
B32: I said, ‘who is he?’ and he went ‘Jon Venables’ brother’.
[..]
CP: Did you want to know where they were going?
B32: Yeah
CP: Did you ask a question?
B32: Yeah I said, ‘where are you going?’ and like, they said,’home to Jon Venables’.
CT: And did you say something about what you wanted to do or what they ought to do?
B32: I said, ‘if you don't take him home I’ll batter you’
CT: Why did you want them to take him home?
B32: Because to let his mum see his head
Thompson clearly invokes a sibling relationship between James Bulger and Venables 
as a means of deflecting difficult questions. James can’t be Thompson’s  brother 
because Child E knows him and his family too well. However as Venables’ brother 
there is a legitimate reason for James’s presence (he is being looked after by 
Venables) and a slight distancing of responsibility for the toddler. If James is 
Venables’ brother and Child E doesn't know Venables very well, it becomes more 
difficult for Child E to take responsibility for the smaller boy.  As Venables’ brother, 
he is really Venables’ responsibility, and all Child E can do is exhort Venables  - and 
threaten him with violence if he doesn't - to take James home to ‘let his mum see his 
head.’
This mobilisation of a sibling relationship to prevent intervention is even clearer in 
the case of an  later interaction with an adult - one of the last people to see James 
alive. On this occasion the boys were in an alley leading towards the railway 
embankment where James was subsequently murdered. Here they encountered  Mr 
WH who was returning from work. It later transpired that Mr WH  knew Robert 
Thompson and his family,  but when he encountered the boys Thompson was up on 
a ledge leading to the railway line and was thus obscured from view. Venables and 
James Bulger were in the alley which was on the route to the witness’s home. In his 
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evidence Mr WH describes how Venables preemptively introduces the idea that 
James is his younger brother. In doing so Venables seems to anticipate that 
intervention might be likely, and to inoculate against that intervention by raising a 
sibling relationship between himself and James.
CP: So, can you describe the person who was on that ledge?
B36 (Mr WH): No
CO: No? Age, roughly?
B36: I couldn’t, he was just in there. As I’m getting up to the little fella, he was sobbing 
and then the other lad spoke to us.
CP: Who was the lad that spoke to you?
B36: The one who is standing at the bottom of the entry
CP: Right, and what was said?
B36: “I’m fed up of having my little brother”
CP: I’m fed up with having my little brother
B36: Yeah. He says, “It’s always the same from school.” and he said, “I’m going to tell 
me mum, I’m not going to have him no more.”
[...]
CP: And did you then go home?
B36: Yeah
It is clear from the report of this interaction that Venables is anticipating some kind 
of intervention. He volunteers a sibling relationship between himself and James as 
an opening gambit which at the same time closes off a number of avenues of 
enquiry which might be available to Mr. WH. His assertion that he is ‘fed up of 
having my little brother’ who is ‘always the same from school’, functions as an 
explanation for the younger boys distress as well as establishing a category 
relationship that gives him rights and responsibilities over the toddler. This is further 
emphasised by the amplification that he is ‘going to tell me mum, I’m not going to 
have him no more’.  In volunteering this final aside to Mr WH, Venables implies 
action to deal with the distressed child.  He will tell his mum that the relationship is 
not working and that to avoid situations like this in the future the arrangements will 
be need to be changed.  Thus, in three short and skilful sentences, the likelihood of 
intervention is undermined. A plausible explanation for the toddlers distress is 
offered; a category relationship which binds Venables and James together (and by 
implication places the bystander outside) is established; and a course of action which 
will (ultimately) attend to James’ distress is suggested.  In fact Mr WH reported that 
he never spoke during the interaction and only recalled the meeting four days later 
after James’s body had been discovered on the railway line.
Traditional Bystander Intervention Theory and the James Bulger Case
I have argued in this paper that failure of bystanders to intervene in the James 
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Bulger case was  a function of  the  assumption that the boys were brothers. This 
assumed category relationship had consequences for the way bystanders 
interpreted what they saw and also inhibited their willingness or ability to help. The 
fact that such a categorisation would inhibit ‘non family’ members was clearly 
recognised by the two older boys who used it to deflect intervention on a number of 
occasions. Before drawing out some of the implications of these arguments for the 
question of bystander intervention in general,  it is important to compare how a 
more traditional bystander intervention theory perspective might account for the 
events in this case. There are clearly a number of difficulties in attempting this kind 
of comparison.  Most of the traditional work on bystander intervention is made up 
of either laboratory based experiments or quasi-experimental field studies. Under 
such conditions a number of key variables can either be controlled or measured 
accurately.  For example, we have already seen that the question of the presence or 
absence of other bystanders is of central concern to the traditional approach to 
bystander intervention. It is predicted that people are more likely to help when they 
are on their own than when they are in the presence of other bystanders. However, 
the data provided by the transcripts makes it difficult to recover information about 
numbers of other people present with a high degree of certainty. It is possible 
nevertheless to make a number of suppositions based on the evidence which is 
available in this case. For example, we know that James was abducted in a shopping 
centre (mall) at a busy time of day. He was also walked along the streets of 
Liverpool during rush hour. Those people who came across the three boys in the 
shopping centre or on the street are likely to have done so in the presence of other. 
It also seems to be the case that at least three (and possibly four) of the bystanders 
came across the three boys in the absence of others. These include bystanders who 
met the boys on open ground or in small alleys and who reported that nobody else 
was present. As none of the bystanders was able to intervene successfully it seems 
reasonable to assume that the presence or absence of others may not have played a 
determining role in this case. In addition, none of the bystanders made mention of 
the presence or absence of others as a factor in their behaviour.  At the same time, 
almost all of the bystanders spoke of their belief about the family status of the three 
boys instead.  Thus, in this particular case, a social categorisation perspective seems 
to have more utility than an approach based on the effect of the presence of other 
people. Of course, this raises the issue of whether what people say can be taken as a 
transparent indication of the factors which impinged upon their decision making. It 
may be that they were not aware of the influence of the presence of others;  were 
unable to articulate the effect of the presence of others; or failed to mention it for 
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fear of exposing themselves to social sanction.  However, even with these 
reservations in mind, and given both the data available and the principles of 
parsimony, it seems that a social categorisation account of the bystanders behaviour 
may be more persuasive in this case.
An examination of the performance of the traditional five step model of bystander 
intervention in accounting for the behaviour of the bystanders in the Bulger case is 
also illuminating.  The traditional model proposes that bystanders pass through five 
steps of evaluation on the way to intervention. These include noticing the event; 
interpreting the event as an emergency, assuming personal responsibility; feeling 
competent to help; and then helping.  This paper has already presented evidence 
which argues that the first two steps of the model would have been satisfied by 
bystanders in this case. The bystanders noticed James and the two older boys and 
interpreted James’ distress and injuries as the signs of a potential emergency. It is at 
the proposed third stage of the model that difficulties arise. The model suggests that 
an evaluation of personal responsibility is required before intervention will be 
contemplated. The most likely reason for failure of an individual to intervene is 
attributed to the phenomenon of ‘diffusion of responsibility’ or what has been 
termed ‘pluralistic ignorance’. It is argued that bystanders assume that, when others 
are present, those other people will know what to do and will do it.  In the absence 
of others, the opportunities to defuse responsibility is reduced and bystanders are 
more likely to take the responsibility on their own shoulders and thus intervene.
We have already seen that reliable data on the physical presence or absence of 
others is difficult to ascertain in this case. However, from the evidence which is 
available from the transcripts, it seems that the way in which the question of 
personal responsibility is resolved may be more complicated than the traditional 
model proposes.  The evidence from this paper suggests that the traditional model  
may be right to stress the importance of the presence of others in how people make 
sense of the situation - but that it does not go far enough.  In particular, the 
traditional model does not distinguish between categories of bystanders -  
something which is clearly important in this case. For example, it can be seen that, 
for most of the witnesses, there were at least two categories of potential bystander. 
The first category of bystander  would have been the two ten year old children who 
had abducted James. As far as the witnesses were concerned, at the time of the 
encounter, these were simply  two boys who were aware of James’ distress.  The 
second category of bystander would have been other adults who witnessed  the 
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scene ( in the Strand Shopping Centre or on the streets of Liverpool).  The principles 
of diffusion of responsibility  suggest that responsibility will be diffused equally 
across both the children and the other adults. Both would simply be treated as 
‘bystanders’. However, there is a clear difference between these two categories of 
bystanders. The two children were only ten years old, and as has already been 
established, looked young for their age. Had the witnesses seen them as ‘young 
children’ then it seems logical to assume that the witnesses would have felt greater, 
rather than less responsibility for James. The fact that witnesses seemed to assume 
that they could be treated as the equivalent of competent adults is something which 
is in need of explanation - and was crucial in the failure of bystanders to intervene in 
this case.  It is because the three boys were categorised as ‘family members’, and not 
‘children’, that the two older boys could be treated as the equivalent of competent 
adults. As it stands, the traditional model would not sensitise us to the importance of 
the way social category relationships were constructed and resolved in this case. In 
urging us to look simply at the presence of others, rather than who we believe those 
others to be, the traditional model may be missing some of the most important 
aspects of the process of bystander intervention. 
Moreover, by considering the category relations between boys and bystanders (and 
the social meanings associated with them) another possibility emerges. It is equally 
possible that the bystanders did feel personal responsibility  but were unable or 
unwilling to intervene in the affairs of another family. There is much evidence to 
support this proposition in the data. For example, a number of bystanders made 
initial moves to intervene, suggesting that they did feel some personal 
responsibility. However, the fact that they were deflected by the explicit 
introduction of a family relationship between the three boys, seems to suggest that 
it is something about the quality of the category relationship and the meanings 
associated with it which is preventing intervention. In these terms, failure to 
intervene can be seen not as the product of degradation of feelings of individual 
responsibility brought on by the presence of others, but as a socially meaningful act 
in its own right. It may be that bystanders were aware not only of the right to 
privacy but also of the sanctions which can follow violations of the boundaries of the 
modern family, and it was such considerations which inhibited intervention.
One of the key features which emerges from the attempt to apply traditional 
bystander theory to the James Bulger case is the absence of a concern with 
categorical relations and how they effect the judgments and actions of bystanders. 
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Moreover, traditional bystander theory  seems to underplay the importance of the 
social norms which guide both the interpretation of events and also decisions about 
the legitimacy of intervention. It seems that the traditional approach may  have 
become  overly reductionist in restricting consideration of the impact of the social 
milieu on bystander intervention to the question of whether the presence of others 
induces diffusion of responsibility and hence leads to apathy. In order to develop a 
deeper (and perhaps more practically useful) understanding of bystander 
phenomenon it is important to incorporate consideration of the social world as a 
more ‘positive’ influence in shaping both interpretation and action in helping 
contexts.
Discussion
This paper has argued for an approach to the study of bystander intervention 
phenomenon based on an analysis of the construction of social categories in local 
contexts.  More specifically, it has proposed that the failure of bystanders to 
intervene in the James Bulger murder was a function of the perception that the three 
boys were brothers.  The fact that bystanders believed, or were told, that the three 
boys shared a social category relationship as members of the same family served to 
inhibit or deflect intervention. It has also been argued that traditional approaches to 
the question of bystander intervention are unable to to account for the behaviour of 
bystanders in the James Bulger case. It is suggested that the difficulties faced by the 
traditional model can be traced to limitations in theorising about the role of social 
norms and values in the way bystanders evaluate events and make decisions about 
intervention. By focussing on the impact of the presence of others the traditional 
model ignores the social meanings which attend not only to the way events might 
be perceived but also to the decision to intervene.
Given the explanation for the actions of bystanders which is advanced in this paper, 
a number of questions remain to be answered. The first question relates to the 
impact of the category of ‘the family’ on this case.  Why should the belief that the 
boys were brothers make intervention difficult?  While a full answer to this question 
is beyond the scope of this paper, some preliminary observations can be made. For 
example,  there is much evidence that the modern family has become an 
increasingly atomised unit (Stone 1977;  Sennett 1984). At the same time over the last 
two decades there has been a rekindling of interest in what might be called the 
politics of the family (Abbot and Wallace 1992; Jones and Millar 1996). This work 
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identifies  ‘the family’  as a key preoccupation of  conservative political movements  
in both Europe and the United States. The major ideological thrust of these 
movements is to prioritise the rights and responsibilities of families over the role of 
the State and civil society. It may be that there have been some unintended 
consequences of this shift of emphasis. For example, it may be that this more 
privatised view of the family has led to an increasingly  insular perspective on the 
responsibilities of adults towards children who are not family members. In short, 
despite the signs of visible injury to a two and a half year old boy, and the 
comparative youth of the boys he was with, assumptions of their family status may 
have served to detach the bystanders from the children. In addition, during the last 
two decades there has been a heated debate about how the government and society 
should respond to problems related to child abuse and child care (Parton 1991). 
There have been high profile deaths of children from violence and neglect as well as 
the ‘discovery’ of child sexual abuse as an important social problematic (Howitt 1992, 
Stainton Rogers and Stainton Rogers 1992).  This increased public awareness of  (or 
at least discussion about) threats to children has occurred alongside anxieties over 
child abduction and child murder.  This combination of factors has led to a climate of 
suspicion in which non-family adults are seen as the biggest threat to the safety and 
security of children. This fear persists despite the evidence that the vast majority of 
physical and sexual crimes against children are committed by family members 
(Creighton 1992, Waterhouse 1993). Bystanders may have been deflected from 
intervening in the James Bulger case by the fear that, as non family members, their 
intervention might have been viewed with suspicion.
The second question which needs to be addressed concerns the qualities of the data 
which are utilised in this paper and the nature of the theoretical claims which can be 
based upon it. The evidence presented here, and on which the theoretical arguments 
are made, are retrospective accounts made by witnesses in a particular legal context.  
It is clear that witnesses could be reconstructing events in ways which favour them, 
absolve them from blame and so on. In addition it may be that there were other 
factors that influenced their  behaviour which would be difficult to voice publicly. 
For example, it would be very difficult for any bystander to have told the Court that 
they did not intervene to help a distressed two year old boy who was subsequently 
murdered, because they were too busy.  It is clear therefore that we cannot treat the 
accounts offered by the bystanders  simply as transparent reflections of their 
underlying psychological state at the time they encountered the three boys. What is 
being argued in this paper is that a failure to intervene on the grounds that  the boys 
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were assumed to be brothers is something which is generally recognised  as a 
legitimate reason for non intervention.  In these terms, failure to intervene can be a 
socially meaningful act. This approach contrasts with more traditional perspectives 
on bystander intervention which tends to see failure to intervene as a sign that an 
individual’s decision-making ability has been impaired by the ‘social impact’ of the 
physical presence of others (Latane 1981). It is an approach which requires the 
inclusion of bodies of evidence and questions which are normally excluded from 
traditional social psychological work on bystander intervention. By recontextualising  
the  analysis of the behaviour of the bystanders (rather than concentrating on 
whether there are people present or not) different questions emerge. The first 
relates to the social and cultural categories which inform behaviour. The second to 
the way these categories are invoked or negotiated in particular local contexts. The 
aim of the present paper has been to show how elements in both of these areas 
contributed to the failure of bystanders to  intervene in the Bulger case. By moving 
away from a focus of the numbers of people present and towards an examination of 
the social category relationships and the norms and values associated with 
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